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ABSTRACT
The term autopoiesis, (meaning ‘self’) and ‘poiesis’ (mean-
ing ‘creation, production’) defines a system capable of repro-
ducing and maintaining itself. The term was introduced by
the theoretical biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco
Varela, in 1972 to define the self-maintaining chemistry of
living cells. The term has subsequently also been applied to
the fields of systems theory and sociology. In this paper we
apply this model to characterise creativity in art practise.
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INTRODUCTION
There are many ways to think about systems that create prod-
ucts we socially conceive of as art. This paper is inspired
by Alfred North Whitehead’s process view of organisation1
[23], viewed though the transformational conceptual-lens of
autopoietic theory (Maturana and Varela [15]); according to
which we view a creative system as a clearly delineated and
identifiable network of continuously operational component
producing processes and concomitant elements, bounded as
an autonomous entity within its own artistic environment.
So construed, the autopoietic artist can never be fully satisfied
with her work, but continually re-engages a complex process
1For Whitehead, all real objects may be better understood as a con-
structed series of events and processes. It is this core idea that White-
head explains the seminal ‘Process and Reality’ [23], concluding
that it is process, rather than substance, that should be taken as the
most fundamental metaphysical constituent of the world, “That ‘all
things flow’ is the first vague generalization which the unsystem-
atized, barely analysed, intuition of men has produced. Without
doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, un-
warped by the sophistications of theory, that experience whose elu-
cidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ulti-
mate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical
system”, (ibid. pp. 317).
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of ‘attention’ (on her current artistic context) and ‘reconsti-
tution’ (of her current artistic structures), as she creatively
reflects and enacts her environment.
The cycle begins as her creative processes are drawn to, and
collectively attend, meaningful distinction(s) within the artis-
tic environment; from which she selects one suitable element,
an interesting ‘artistic gesture’ to reinterpret2. Once all the
elements of the artistic context have been processed, the cre-
ative cycle is complete; the old artistic context can be dis-
carded, and a new creative cycle begin.
In this manner the autopoietic artist continuously reflects
back on the world she has just brought forth, in order to gen-
erate new re-interpretations. While these creative processes
continue to produce interesting and meaningful outputs, her
autopoietic unity will continue intact; conversely, if her out-
put becomes gradually less meaningful and interesting, her
creative unity will begin to dissolve and ultimately die; and
the artist return to reflect upon the tabula-rasa again3.
ON AUTOPOIESIS AND ALLOPOIESIS
Autopoiesis or self-creation
Maturana and Varela’s original definition of autopoiesis is
found in [15]:
“An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (de-
fined as a unity) as a network of processes of production
(transformation and destruction) of components which:
(i) through their interactions and transformations contin-
uously regenerate and realize the network of processes
(relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the
machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the
components) exist by specifying the topological domain
of its realization as such a network”, (p. 78).
Thus, the boundary of an autopoietic system is determined
circularly by the production of its constituent elements; in
2By modulating the distinctions she is drawn to attend, as she cre-
atively interacts with and explores her environment, the autopoietic
artist can adapt what she construes as ‘artistically meaningful’ in her
own historical dialogue.
3.. in much the same way as Koskinen identifies that all business
organisations eventually wither, dissolve away and ultimately die “..
decisions have to be imagined as events. In the very moment of their
coming into being, they already fade away. Therefore, only little can
be changed in business organizations. As decisions disappear with
their appearance, they cannot be altered, but only give cause for the
production of new decisions, which are subject to the same mecha-
nism. And this is the reason why business organizations step by step
wither and die”, (K.U. Koskinen, ‘Why do Business Organizations
die? Social Autopoietic Perspective’).
this way the organisation of, say, a cell is both ‘circular’ and
autopoietic because the components that specify the cell are
the same components that the organisation of the cell secures
and maintains. It is this circularity that maintains the cell as a
living entity. It is in this sense that an autopoietic system can
be considered as a special type of homeostatic system, where
the variable to be maintained and controlled is the organisa-
tion and behaviour of the system. For Francisco Varela, au-
topoiesis is both necessary and sufficient to characterise the
organisation of living, autonomous systems.
In addition to maintaining the conditions for its own contin-
ued existence, an autopoietic system may, in addition, gener-
ate allopoietic system(s) as output(s).
Allopoiesis
In contrast to autopoiesis, the operation of an allopoietic sys-
tem is given in terms of the concatenation of processes. Such
processes are not the processes that specify the components
of the system itself, as a unity; instead the components are
produced by other processes that are independent of the or-
ganisation of the system. Because the components that make
up an allopoietic system’s existence are contingent upon other
systems, an allopoietic system is never ‘fully autonomous’.
Some examples of allopoietic systems are: cars, trains, robots
etc.
Furthermore, because an allopoietic system is always contin-
gent on the output of other systems for it existence, its tele-
ology and meaning will always reside in the observers world,
never in its own - the systems - world.
On the autopoietic status of systems
To determine whether a system is or is not autopoietic in its
organization, Varela et al. [22] have developed six key points
or criteria that should be applied to the system; Koskinen [10]
restates these criteria as follows:
1. Determine, through interactions, if the unity has identifi-
able boundaries. If the boundaries can be determined, pro-
ceed to 2. If not, the entity is indescribable and we can say
nothing.
2. Determine if there are constitutive elements of the unity,
that is, components of the unity. If these components can
be described, proceed to 3. If not, the unity is an un-
analyzable whole and therefore not an autopoietic system.
3. Determine if the unity is a mechanistic system, that is, if the
component properties are capable of satisfying certain re-
lations that determine the unity, the interactions, and trans-
formations of these components. If this is the case, proceed
to 4. If not, the unity is not an autopoietic system.
4. Determine if the components that constitute the bound-
aries of the unity constitute these boundaries through pref-
erential neighbourhood relations and interactions between
themselves, as determined by their properties in the space
of their interactions. If this is not the case, you do not
have an autopoietic unity because you are determining its
boundaries, not the unity itself. If 4 is the case, however,
proceed to 5.
5. Determine if the components of the boundaries of the
unity are produced by the interactions of the components
of the unity, either by transformation of previously pro-
duced components, or by transformations and/ or coupling
of non-component elements that enter the unity through its
boundaries. If not, you do not have an autopoietic unity; if
yes, proceed to 6.
6. If all the other components of the unity are also produced
by the interactions of its components as in 5, and if those
which are not produced by the interactions of other compo-
nents participate as necessary permanent constitutive com-
ponents in the production of other components, you have
an autopoietic unity in the space in which its components
exist. If this is not the case and there are components in the
unity not produced by components of the unity as in 5, or if
there are components of the unity which do not participate
in the production of other components, you do not have an
autopoietic unity.
Thus, the successful application of the above six-point taxon-
omy is sufficient to determine if a system is autopoietically
organized (or not).
LUHMANN: AUTOPOEISIS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS
In formulating his law of requisite variety William Ross
Ashby [2] observed that to survive in a complex environment
while maintaining internal stability and structure, a system
must be able to generate an appropriate gamut of responses
to an ever changing environment. In contrast, General Sys-
tems Theory, as formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy [4],
assumes an open systems model4, viewing complex systems
in terms of the difference between ‘the system and its envi-
ronment’; contra a closed system model5 and mereological
distinctions between, say, the physical instantiation of ‘whole
and parts’.
Influenced by General Systems Theory, the core element of
Niklas Luhmann’s ‘system theoretic’ view of social systems
is communication: social systems are systems of communi-
cation and society is the most encompassing social system. In
Luhmann’s view [12] a social system is defined by the bound-
ary between itself and its environment, which is considered
an infinitely complex (‘chaotic’) exterior. Thus, relative to
the exterior, the interior of the social system is a space of
reduced complexity: communication within a social system
operates by selecting only a limited element of all the infor-
mation available outside the system. In this way Luhmann’s
concept of communication inherently entails a “reduction of
complexity”, whereby the criteria according to which infor-
mation is selected and processed is meaning. Thus social
systems are operationally closed because, while they use and
rely on resources from their environment, those resources do
not become an integral part of the systems’ operation.
4An open system exchanges material, energy, people, capital, infor-
mation etc. with its environment.
5A closed system does not allow transfers in or out of the system.
Thus for Luhmann, social systems operate by processing
meaning and furthermore, each system has a distinctive iden-
tity; a unity, that is constantly reproduced in its communi-
cation and depends on what is considered meaningful (and
what is not) for that system. If the system fails to maintain
this identity, it dies, it ceases to exist and it dissolves back
into the wider environmental ether whence it came.
Luhmann conceived this process of continuous reproduction
from elements previously filtered from an over-complex en-
vironment as autopoiesis6.
ART AS AUTOPOIESIS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW
The resonance of art with autpoiesis has been explored by
several thinkers, most notably Luhmann who in his theory of
social systems [13] famously put forward a ‘theory of art’ as
“a particular system of communication”, i.e. “.. the function
of art can be traced to problems of meaningful communica-
tion” [11]. For Luhmann, the domain of art is to be viewed
as an operationally closed and self-referential communicative
system, an autopoietic system; radically suggesting that it is
“.. from the autopoiesis of art which works of art will be cre-
ated”. This led Rampley, in his review [19], to suggest that
the “.. key question Luhmann addresses [in his conception of
art and autopoiesis] is how art differentiates itself from other
systems”.
Although the influence of Luhmann’s conception of art [in
terms of autopoiesis and communication] continues to be per-
vasive, it has not gone unchallenged. For example, as early
as 2001 Sevanen [20] observed “.. the basic problem in these
notions lies in the way in which their description of the re-
lationships existing between different systems is only in very
narrow terms. Consequently they partially ignore the present
process of de-differentiation which has noticeably changed
the status of art in society”.
Similarly, albeit in a more recent essay, Schinkel asserts that
Luhmann does not have an adequate theory of“The Artworld”
[21], but more positively suggests that by “conceiving of ‘The
Artworld’ as an autopoietic social system, Luhmann’s highly
original work can be brought to bear in the sociology of art”.
In addition, explicit links between autopoiesis and art-
practise have also been explored; for example, in 2010 Mario
Vieira de Carvalho [6] offered a view of twentieth century
serialist music through the lens of autopoiesis:
“.. in particular, the postulation according to which ”the
essence of art is the self-programmation of works of art”
(ibid: 332) seems to find - for instance, in music - its
only realization in some so-called serial works created
in the 1950s by composers from the Darmstadt circle
and in some manifestations of aleatoric music.”
6NB. Both Varela and Maturana have forcefully argued against this
appropriation of the term autopoiesis; in Maturana and Varela’s
conception, people cannot be proper elements of a social system’s
renewal because (a) in describing social systems as operationally
closed networks of communications, Luhmann ignores the fact that
communications presuppose human communicators [17] and (b)
people are not (re)produced as an integral and core part of a social
system’s renewal processes [18].
“The homologies between Luhmann’s theory of art and
the theory of serial music from the early fifties seem in
this way to be evident. They have in common a con-
cept of self-reference and of autopoiesis that radically
excludes a critical interaction both of science and art (as
socio-communicative systems) with real life.”
However as the notion of autopoiesis and art has become
more widespread in the arts, social sciences and humani-
ties, Maturana and Varela’s original, tightly theoretic, defini-
tion (as outlined above) has become more and more blurred,
such that in her recent art project, “AUTOPOIESIS” (2014),
the academic and artist Btihaj Ajana (the project’s curator)
merely offers autopoiesis as being (i) synonymous with, “the
act of self-creation and self-production” and (ii) in the context
of the AUTOPOIESIS exhibition, merely “.. a metaphor for
what this experimental cultural project is all about”; indeed
there is now an established tradition of using autopoiesis sim-
ply as a metaphorical springboard for inspiration in art, with
numerous exhibitions and artworks taking their cue from the
term7.
‘CREATIVITY’ AS AN AUTOPOIETIC PROCESS
Historical
A traditional, representation-heavy, view of the artist as an
open-system, fundamentally posits his activities as contin-
gent on external influences; the artist responds creatively to
demands from a pre-given, objective environment by build-
ing and creatively processing appropriate internal representa-
tions. In this view, through his practise, the artist builds rep-
resentations of a pre-given reality - universal, objective, and
transferable - and it is his role, as artist, to transform these
representations in novel, interesting and creative ways.
The contrary, autopoietic perspective reflects that creativity is
autonomous and operationally closed8. In addition, autopoi-
etic creative systems stand ‘structurally coupled’ with their
medium; fundamentally embedded in a dynamic of changes,
exercised via appropriate sense-action coupling. This contin-
uous dynamic can be considered a rudimentary form of cre-
ative knowledge.
Emerging from a General System Theory perspective, the ex-
ploration of autopoiesis in the context of ‘creativity studies’
was first outlined by Gornev in 1997 [7] who first set out to
construct a theory of human creativity on the foundation of
autopoietic systems theory (AST), whereby:
“creativity is seen as an activity recurrently reproduced
by couplings of specific states of moderate emotional
arousal with transitional environments, i.e. soft social
structures in which the world is permitted to be both
subjective and objective; the archetype of these creative
7Eg. Alongside Btihaj Ajana there have also been recent exhibitions
from artists as diverse as Ken Rinaldo; Sean Clark, Robert Genn etc
etc.
8It is operationally close in the sense that there are sufficient pro-
cesses within it to maintain the unity of creation and that, while
they use (and rely upon) resources from their environment, those
resources do not themselves become an integral core element of the
creative systems’ operation.
couplings can be found in the earliest perfect environ-
ment formed by the symbiotic infant/mother relation-
ship”.
In contrast in 2010 Takashi Iba [8] defined “Creative Systems
Theory” in order to view creative processes9 in an alternative
way, “.. focusing the process itself without the reference to
psychic or social aspects”. In his work Iba postulated cre-
ative processes to be “autopoietic systems whose elements
are ‘discoveries’ emerged by a synthesis of three selections:
idea, association, and consequence”.
However, by merely defining that “creativity is an autopoi-
etic system whose element is discovery”, Iba’s work, like
Gornev’s first tentative explorations thirteen years earlier, re-
mains floating very much at a conceptual level; it offers little
insight into how ‘creative process’ at the personal, ‘psychic’,
artistic level could ever actually be cached out; indeed, as he
stated in the paper (ibid), this was never his project.
Our view
Conversely, and in an analogous manner to Luhmann’s con-
ception of information processing, we view creativity as en-
tailing a reduction in complexity of meaning in the environ-
ment; with the system operationally closed because, while
its creativity uses and relies upon resources from its environ-
ment, these resources do not become part of the underlying
systems’ operation.
Viewed under this conception, a creative system (a) processes
meaning and (b) maintains a distinctive identity; a unity that
is repeatedly reproduced in its operation, contingent upon
what is considered meaningful (or not) for the system. If the
environmental conditions are such that, over time, the creative
system can no longer maintain this identity, then its investi-
gations will simply dissolve away to void.
In this way creativity is a constructive process; it inherently
reflects an individually constructed artistic reality. Further-
more, because autopoietic creativity emerges from the obser-
vation of distinctions and not of things, its operation is fun-
damentally contingent on its own history, and in this way is
ever-sensitive to its own historical context.
In summary, and in contrast to the classical view of creative
processes building (reflecting on and transforming) represen-
tations of a pre-given, out-there, world, an autopoietic view of
creativity is based on the simultaneous knowledge processes
of sensing and memory. In this context memory10 entails that:
• the unity has access to its existing knowledge;
• previous, accumulated, knowledge modulates the the
unity’s ongoing structures and operations;
9Iba defines that a creative process consists of “a sequence of dis-
coveries, which include problem finding, problem solving, observa-
tion, hypothesis formation, method selection, practice, and interpre-
tation”, (ibid).
10A self-referential process which facilitates access to, and learning
from, previous experiences and knowledge [10].
• the unity’s cognitive structures and operation affect its ac-
quisition of new data from the environment and its creation
of new internal knowledge structures.
Furthermore, we observe that by conceptualising creative
processes within an autopoietic framework, we must con-
clude that creativity is never a directly transferable skill or
knowledge11.
THE AUTOPOIETIC ARTIST
The continual creative swarmic processes of our autopoietic
artists’ attention and reconstitution (sketching) mechanisms
are detailed sections below and are illustrated in accompa-
nying video, which displays her behaviour as she iteratively
decodes a line-sketch of an abstract painting by Willem De
Kooning12.
The ‘autopoietic’ artist is composed of two functionally dis-
tinct types of agent: (i) a swarm of attending agents13, akin to
ants (and governed by the principles of Stochastic Diffusion
Search (SDS) [5] ) and (ii) a swarm of drawing agents akin to
birds (and governed by the principles of a Particle Swarm Op-
timiser (PSO) [9]). The job of the attending agents is to select
areas of meaning14 for the drawing agents to ‘re-interpret’.
Our ‘autopoietic’ artist is thus continually engaged in a pro-
cess of sensing her environment and reconstituting it (by it-
eratively first choosing a line in the scene and re-rendering
it). The bounds of the autopoietic artist are defined by the
shifting movements of the swarms that comprise her; the el-
ements of the autopoietic artist are the agents of the swarms;
the behaviour of each swarm is fully defined by the behaviour
of its agents (SDS and PSO); the bounds of the swarms are
defined by the hypotheses (positions) of all the SDS agents,
whose behaviour changes and in turn modifies the bounds;
the components of the boundaries are produced by the inter-
actions of the components of the unity, by transformation of
previously produced hypotheses; and because the iterative re-
initialisation of the SDS agent-hypotheses are produced by
the interactions of the SDS swarm (and all other PSO agents
participate as necessary permanent constitutive components
11Cf. Koskinen on ‘autopoietic knowledge systems in project-based
companies’ [ibid]
12Cf. https://youtu.be/EtEAAi1hbFw. In our example the artistic en-
vironment is initially an outline sketch of Kooning’s abstract canvas,
displayed initially in the right-hand panel of the video; with the cre-
ative output, displayed on the left.
13In [3] Francisco de Paula Barretto and Suzete Venturelli outline
a evolutionary multi-agent system inspired by autopoiesis, that has
been deployed in a computer game (‘Zer0’) to compose emergent
music in real time. Although the authors note the influence of au-
topoiesis in their conceptualisation, the Barretto and Venturelli pa-
per fails to expand any manner in which the Zer0 agents qualify as
autpoietic systems; indeed their use of explicit goals and internal
representations argue against this conceptualisaiotn being fully mer-
ited. For these reasons we are unable to consider [3] further in this
exposition.
14For example, in our system we have defined such an area of interest
(or ‘meaning distinction’) to be a line situated in a complex region
of the image; an area that is rich/dense in comparison with other
lines. Thus, by suitably redefining the distinction deployed by the
population of Stochastic Diffusion agents (as described in Section
V), we can modify what constitutes ‘meaning’ for the autopoietic
artist as she interacts with her creative context/environment.
in the production of other components), Varela et al’s criteria
[22] for an autopoietic entity are appropriately instantiated
in the organisation of our ‘autopoietic’ artist in the creative
space in which her creative unity exists.
Thus, following Luhmann’s conception of information pro-
cessing, we view the working autopoietic artist as entailing
a reduction in complexity, ravenously consuming ‘meaning-
distinctions’ within her environment; in this way the autopoi-
etic artist iteratively decodes her environment by continu-
ously first selecting, then processing, areas of meaning
Over time, with her artistic ‘interest’ drawn to areas of rich
complexity, the autopoietic artist, so construed, iteratively
erases meaningful-distinctions (lines) in her current artistic
context, so gradually simplifying the structure of the work.
By iteratively focussing on meaning-distinctions as-areas-of-
rich-complexity, as the decoding process unfolds it sometimes
leads to a less complex (line) structure and ultimately may re-
sult in an empty canvas; therein reifying the artwork’s ‘death’
and the tabula rasa.
Alternatively, by refocussing the autopoietic artist’s reflec-
tions on ‘meaning’ (as explored by the Stochastic Diffusion
swarm) onto different constitutive elements, and modifying
her reconstitution (of the resulting artistic structure), differ-
ent behaviours of autopoietic creativity can be induced. E.g.
By insisting that the reconstitutive processes must generate
as many elements of ‘meaning-distinction’ as they consume,
the induced autopoietic processes becomes less likely to fade
away and more open-ended in their creative endeavour.
CONCLUSION: THE AUTOPOIETIC ARTIST AS A
‘WEAKLY’ CREATIVE SYSTEM
In summary, in the context of Al-Rifaie and Bishop’s ‘weak’
and ‘strong’ taxonomy of [computational] creativity [14], al-
though we have presented autopoiesis as offering a new con-
ception of ‘strong’ artistic creativity, with her ‘operational
processes’ externally instantiated in the execution of a com-
puter program15 and her idea of ‘meaning’ (e.g. as areas
of high image density/complexity) externally engineered16,
sensu-stricto the particular computational autopoieticic artist
described herein, fundamentally remains an allopoietic sys-
tem; we offer her merely as a simple epistemic lens though
which to better view, understand and frame the underlying
processes of creativity, and not as a computational instantia-
tion of strong creativity. As argued elsewhere [14], any such
ontological claim must entail much more serious engagement
with the physical embodiment of the underlying autopoietic
system.
15There is an old debate in the field of computational autopoiesis that
effectively rests of the following question: is a computational sim-
ulation of an autopoietic entity a genuine autopoietic unity? Those
who argue not assert that because the components of, say, the com-
putational autopoietic artist described herein, are fundamentally in-
stantiated via a computer simulation, (whose organisation - power,
hardware and software etc - they do not participate in regenerating
and maintaining)
16Contra Maturana and Varela’s conception of autopoiesis as a sys-
tem description to define and explain the nature of living systems as
fully autonomous entities, each with a unique teleological behaviour.
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